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"We'd get the people from research, sales and production together,
.md everyonc wuuld say `Not this' and 'Not that.' We'd talk but there
wuidd bc uu zy;nr~ncuL. (...) Praluct plaiwing has to lw un a tight
schedule. But we'd have another discussiou, and :wother study nnd
then more preparation. And finally, the decision would come months
later." [Nobuhiko Kawamoto, President of Honda Motor Co. (The Wa1l
Street Journal, 4~11~91, page Al.)]
"Duwpite what Lextbuoks say, must import:mt decisiorui in corporate
lifc .uc made by individu.~s, not by wmrnittcos. (...) To sum up:
nothing stands still in this wurld. I likc to go duck huuting, whcre
constant movement and charrge are facts of life. You can aim at a duck
and get it in your sights, but thc duck is always moving. In orrlr.r to
hit the duck, you havc to movc your gun. But a committee faced witb
a major decisiou can't always move as quickly as the eveuts it's trying
to respond to. By the time the committee; is ready to shout, the duck
has Hown away." [Lee lacocca, former head of Ford Motor Co. and of
Chrysler Motor Co. (L.ee Iacocca (1984): lacoccn: An Autobiography,
New York: Bantarn; page 52.)]
1. Introduction
In a dyn:uuic world, the profits a finn tnakr~ are positivcly rclated to how
well a firm predicts the future - i.e., other firms' choices, macroeconomic
conditions, consumers' attitudes. Wc envision the firm as functioning with
sonle default ruh~, strategies or policies until sonlc charrgt~ are decided by
the management teanr. The management makes evaluations of the state of
nature, and takes det:isions as to whether to alter its policy - i.e., the status
quo. We assume that changes in policy are given by sorue fixed reaction
function that maps the pair consisting of the current ev~uation of the state
of nattue and the present policy into some specific xctions. Until another
change in policy occurs, then the firm is in "automatic-pilot mode." A better
evaluation of the state of nature is assunred to be associated with higher
profits.
The state of nature, B, is a.s.sunled to be constantly evolving as described
by the following first-order Markov process
Br - GrBr-1 f wt (1)
We thank Dallas Burtraw for useful commcnts.
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where G~ is a known quantity and w~ is the system equation error. Each
member, i, of the management team, or comnuttee, can observe a signal y;T
(which may be a vector or a scalar) which is lineazly related to the unobserv-
able vector BT that represents the true state of nature at time r,
ylT - ftTeT T viT (`)
where f;T is known, and v;T is manager i's observation error.
Equations (1) and (2) can be embedded into a Kalman filter model. The
Kalman filter model (Kalman (1960)) is a recursive procedure for making
inferences about a vector of pazameters using the history of some observable
quantities which are linearly related to it. The density of the state parameters
(the state of nature, B) is evaluated at the current time, future observations
are predicted, and, when they become available, the prediction error is used
to update our inference about the state parameter. Under normality assump-
tions, the Kalman filter features some optimal statistical properties, and its
simplicity and elegance makes it a very attractive algorithm. (See Meinhold
and Singpurwalla (1983) for an introductory exposition.)
In the Kalman filtcr literature, we normally have r- t, ruid equations
(1) and (2) are known as the system equation and the obseruation equation,
respectively. In the usual Kalman filter formulation, there is an observ~ation
of yt~ at each t and the posterior distribution of B given the clata is updated
whenever a new observation becomes available - i.e., at e.ach t.
Suppose that when a team consists of n people, decisions cannot be taken
at every t and the updating step is performed only every 8(n) periods. This
means that equation (2) holds only for r- á(n), 26(n), .... On the other
hand, the precision of the posterior distribution of B increases with the team
size, ra. "I'herc~ is a tradcxiff then betwe,~c~n gc~tting more, information Less often
versus getting less iiiformation more aften. We shall a.5sume that 6(1) - 1
and á(n), which we call dclay famctioTy increases with n. In addition, for
simplicity, we shall also assume that b(n) is an integer for all n.
3
Thc motivation is that group decision-making is a long, expensive and
complicate~l process aud, while the managenrcnt tearn is engagcxl in this task,
the firrn is in automatic-pilot modc. A single-nranager team might generate
less prc.~cise estimates but miglit be able to produce thenr more often.
In statistical terms, the question becomes whether it is better to get a
bigger sanrple each tirne we sample (not at every t) and update less often, or
to sample less at each t but update more frequently. Put differently; which
is the optimal group size, n', that minimizes posterior uncertainty?
In this paper we shall characterize different aspects of the covariance matrix
of the signal errors that the committee members receive whiclr are important
to the optimal size of the management team.
In the simple model that we deve]op in tlris paper, we don't address any
problews related to the optirnal decision rule by a committee under different
environments. This is an important issue anci its study requires imposing
some structure on the type of problems that the committee is facing (see, e.g.,
Kolr (1994), and Sah and Stiglitz (1988)).r We also ignore any communication
and information-pooling problems (see, e.g., Berger (1985), Section 4.11 on
`Conrbining Evidence and Group Decisions' and the references cited therein).
In the model developed in this paper, information from different sources is
pooled via the likelihood by the usual Bayesian updating mechanism.
2. The Management Model
For simplicity, we will assume that each manager gets a single signal - i.e.,
that g~T is a scalar and uot. a vector Uut our results extend to the gen-
eral case where each manager observes a vcxtor of signals. The system and
~ Sc~ :~ho Hubermw wd [.och (1!)~4) for a deriv.ition of bounde on texin eize baced on
tLe mm~ilxcti' iucentivM tu vhare iuCormatiou; :wJ K:dzner (1S)!)S) fur n model in which
the wst oC makiug :~nd implc~ucutiug dccisiuus depcud ou the fr:~ction uf cmployeex who
participato iu tl~c pruce.s uud iu LIIC SIIOIIFLrILV of thoir preferencuw.
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observation equations are:
BL - GcBC-1 f tut, t- 1,2,... (3)
yr - FTer f Vr, T- b(n)f2b(n),... (4)
TLe number of mrtnagers, n, is reHected in the dimension of yr and in the
frequency of the obse.rvation equation (4) tluougtl the delay function, 6(n).
More explicitly, we have F, f f ], and y, y„r]'.- ~flr, 2ri..., ur - ~ylr,y2re...,
TLe distributional assumptions are2
t~it ~ N(~,W)~
vt ~ N(0, V ).
The prior distribution on B, corresponding to our knowledge at tinle 0, before
any observation is ta.ken, is
Bo ~ N({io, Co).
The infornlation in the observations acquired through (4) and the dynamics of
B inherent in (3) will jointly lead to the posterior, given a set of observations
Ye,
Be~Ye ~ N(lk~Ce). (5)
Thus, at time t all available information concerning the state of nature BL is
summarized by its conditional mean and variance.
2 Actually, wc don't ueed to require normality. Girón and Rojano (1994) ahow that
ellipticity is enough for the Kalman filter to have the usual recuriion equations. In that case,
a diagonal covariance mntrix impliea laclc of correlation but not independence. Covariance
matrices that are not constant over time can be easily accommodated.
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2.1. Single Manager
If n- 1(which implies b(1) - 1 by assumption), then we u.9e
~
ee - 1le - Fccelae-t
R~ - c~c~-,c~ ~ w
~e-FéReFefV
to update the posterior density of Bc given by (5),
I~e - ccWe-t -F ReFeQe lee
Ci 1- Ri 1 f FeV-tFi.
These are the usual Kalman recursion equations -~ce, e.g., Meinhold and
Singpurwalla (1983) or Girón and R.ojat~o (1994).
2.2. Management Team
When b(n) ~ 1, but some other integer value, we only obaerve the y's at
r - á(n),26(n),...,lb(n). Then
eT - ~IT - l'.fGTYT-I,
R~ - c~Cc-tc~ f w,
QT - FTR, FT f V.
Note that the updating of Rc is performed through the system equation and
thus takes plac:e every period. In order to change the values of eT ancl QT
we require an observation which occurs every 6(n) periods. IIefore a new
observ.ation is made, we still use ( 3) at e,tu:h t, and after a new observation
we upcíate thc posterior density of Bi. The posterior mean is given by
r ce{le-t, for t~ r
1~~ - Sl ~1 n n
G?{!T-t T ,NFTWT 1 ~,T~ for t- r;
ancl the preeision is upclated by
(Ri 1, for t~ T
C~ 1 - ( (6)
lRr1fF,V-1F'r, fort-r.
Given b(n), now how to choose n such that the posterior precision, Ci1, is
maximum? In a classical context, this c:orravponds to the n which minimizes
MSE, if we use pc as a point estimate for Bc.
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3. Covariance Structures for the Managers' Signals
If all managers have the same observation models, then
FT - IfIT,... fJ,IT) - IJT,...,JTI
{' ~ f ,
- iT ~ L1L - JTL1t
where r.,, is a column vector of n ones.3
(7)
In a sense, RT 1 in (6) is the preci.gion before incorporating the last infor-
mation available, and the value of the last observation is
ST - FTV -1F.'r - (ÍT éY cn)V -1(ÍT ~ ~f~)~
Let us now consider possible specifications for V, the covariance matrix of
the observation errors of the team.
It is worth noting that, by assumption, tlte delay function, b(n), is a func-
tion of t.hc sirc of thc tc{ttu ouly. It docw nut dcpcud on the similr~rity of tho
views of the committee members at all. In the sampling analogy, the cost
of sampling would not be affected by the correlation among samples. It is
conceivable that, in real life, meetings would be shorter, the greater the sim-
ilarity in the views of the members of the committee. However, 6(n) is not
intended to reprc.~ent otily the length of the actual meetings that take place
but all the costs incidental to having lazge management teams.
3.1. Independent Ennrs
A simple hypothesis is that every manager commits errors independently
of those of the other members of the team. In addition, the quality of all
managers could be considered equal in that all errors have equal variances.
In this case,
V - a2I„
3'1'he operator `Q9' ia the Krnnecher prvduct which involves multiplying each element of
tlie matrix of the Icft by the entire matrix of the right.
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where I„ is an identity matrix of dimension n, and
ST - a-a(fTfT ~ L11~11) - n0-afTfT'
3.2. Equicorrelated Errors
If wc cnaintain the assumption that all managers have equal observation vari-
ance, but allow for the same amount of correlation between all members of
the team, we get the second case of interest. If
V - (aa - ~Í)In i' ry~n~n (8)
with Qa 1 ry for ry? 0 and aa 1-(n - 1)ry for ry G 0, we obtain
1 ( a-1') 1 7 ~
1'- - ~ - I,~ - (a2 - ry)(aa - 7 f n7) ~`~,.
and the value of the last observation becomes
ST - (fT ~ ~ft)~-1(iT ~ `1t) -
~a ~ (n - 1)ryftff
n f' ifry~0andn1l.G 2 fr r
O
Of course, this case specializes to independence for ry- 0. Note that the
correlation coefficient between team members is given by p- ry~aa and that
we need to restrict p to the interval (-(n- 1)-1,1) in order to assure that V
in (8) is positive definite.
4. Firm Policy
In tlus model, all teams -regardleas of size-- optimally process the infor-
mation available to them; viewed from a classical perspective, the models
produce unbiased forecasts for 6. Therefore, a óetter evaluation of the state
of nature is synonymous with a higher precision, C-1. Then, when com-
paring the performance of a single manager against a management team we
n





1 G1CaGi f W Ri 1 f ff'o-~ Ri 1
2 G2C1G'Z f W Rz' -~ ff'o-~ Ri 1
b(~a.) GhC~--iC~ ~[4' R6 i f .ff~a-~ R-1 f nff'(o~ f ( n - 1)7)-1
Table 2. Comparison of precision matrices at each t: n vs n f 1.
C-~
t Ri n ntl
1 G~CoG~f W R~~ Ri~
2 GzC1Gz i- W Rz ~ Rz ~
6(n) Gb(n)Cb(n)-~G6(n) t W Rá(~) t nJJ'(o~ t(n - 1)7)-1 Re(;,)
A(nil) Ge~ntilCe(„ti)-~G~„fi fW R~s„ti RF.~t~
t(ntl)ffi(oz~nry)-~
only need to compare the precision of their posterior densities of the state of
nature B at every t. This is what we call overnll firne policy. We might also
want to consider the case where decisions are only taken every 6(n) periods,
even if the management consists of a single manager who updates her view
of the world with a higher frequency. We call this case special deciaions.
In tables 1 and 2, the case of independence corresponds to ry- 0. Note
that the series of Ci 1 matrices generated by the last two columns cliffer in
that the C~ ~ u.ged in the formula for C~ either incorporatea the information
gain of an observ.ation ( n - 1) or not (n 1 1 and t G 6(n)).
ln ca~c. G~C~-1Gi -F W would stay roughly the same for botL choices of n,
however, we can make some simple comparisons. This applies, in particular, if
ff'Q-2, the added prccision of one single cnanager observation, is small com-
pared to (G~C~-1G~ i- W)-1 which represents the accumulated information
of the firm at time t without this last observation. Of course, this situation
would occur if R remained constant, but it is only required that R evolves
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similarly under both single managers and team decisions. We are then able
to use tables 1 and 2 for deriving some "rules of thumb."
4.1. Ovemll Fi~m Policy
Here we compare the sum of the precision increases over all periods until a
certain lwrizon T- ë(re) (or a mttltiple of 6(n)). Of course, different values
of n will aLso lead to different updatea of R at time t. The value of R can go
up, or down with updating; if R would not be affected greatly by the value
of n,4 then we could compare directly the cases with n- 1 and n~ 1 over,
e.g., tlre period from t- 1 to t- à(n).
In that case, then thc n-manager team wordd be preferable to a single
manager wlrenever
ó(n)(ë(n) -~ 1) rt
2a2 ~ 02 -f- (n - 1)ry
where ry- 0 reflects independence; or, rearranging, if
ó(n)(ó(n) } 1) G n - n - a(n), (9)2 1.~ nsl - 1 f(n - 1)P
where p - ry~a2 measures the correlation between the managers' signals. Note
that a(n) always increases with n, since we must have -(n - 1)-1 G p G 1.
We can use table 2 to compare an n-sized team with an ( n t 1)-sized team.
For fair comparison, consider the horizon ó(n) x ë(n f 1), so that a size n
team Iras made ó(n t 1) decisions, and the team of size n~- 1 has had ó(n)
updates. Again, if R evolves sinularly, we would prefer to augment the size
of the team from n to n f 1 whenever
a(n) a(n ~ 1)
ó(n)(ê(n) f 1) ~ ó(n -F 1)(b(n -~ 1) f 1) ~
An analogous formula applies for comparing sizes n and m, and for m- 1
this will reduce to (9), since a(1) - ó(1) - 1.
4 For R to remain constant, conaider the case where both G and C remain constant (from
the second column of table 1). For n~ 1 that implies that R- GC(n)G' f W.
For n- 1
we must have C(1)-r -(GC(1)G' t W)-r f f f'o-~. We write C(n) to stresa that the
precision matricea at each t will differ in the n- 1 and n~ 1 caees.
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.(.2. Specia! Decisions
In the case of crucial decisions that need to be takeu at a particular point
in time r, we can compare the information accumulated at r by updating
every period with that obtained by a team uraking only one decision, namely
at tinre r. As the team is apecifically put together for this decision, we take
r- 6(n). Iu the equicorrelated case, when n- 1 after ó(n) updates,
C;r- ó(n)a-~f f' -H R-r
and when n ~ 1, after one update
n
CT r - o~ f(n - 1)yf f~
~- R-r,
so tlrat n~ 1 is preferable to n- 1 if
ó(n) G a(n). (10)
If we now compare teams of sizes n and n-F 1, we should consider the precision
at some time point corresponding to acrucial decision, say, r - ó(n) xó(nf 1).
Then, we would favor si~e n f 1 over size n if
a(n) a(n t 1)
ó(n) ~ b(n -~ 1) ,
and, generally, we prefer size n over size m if
a(~n a(n)
b(m) ~ ó(n) ~
Choosing m- 1, we rcx;upe.rate (10).
If C~-r for n- 1 becomes larger tharr Cr-r witlr a tearu (i.e., in case of
updating every period, the precision decre~es) then we will choose larger n
than suggestc:d by (9) or (10). In oppo~rite cases we shall clrUr~se a sma]ler
teanr.
I1
.(.3. Behavior of n(n)
We have scen that a(n) as defined in (9) can, in some cases, be compar~ed
with 6(n) or 6(n)(ó(n) f 1)~2 directly. Let us now examine the propetties of
a(n) as n varies.
Clearly n(1) - 1 and for all possible values of p we have that a(n) is strictly
increasing in n. For positive p (i.e., 0 G p G 1) we obtain
s
lim a(n) - Q - 1~ 1
n-"~ ?' P
whereas for other values of p(i.e., -(n - 1)-~ G p C 0),
lim a(n) - oo...-.itillvl
In this latter c:~.u~, the rc.cluimment of a Ix~sitive definite observation error
matrix V induces an asymptote at n- 1 f ~p~-~. This can be interpreted as
follows. Given a negative error correlation p we cannot let the team grow too
large, as then this fixc~d negative correlation would confuse matters such that
an observation would have a negative value. If we want n to grow, we need
to decrease ~P~.
As managers teud to observing without error, p will tend to one, and a(n)
will tend to one for any value n is allowed to take. In that case, we will, of
course, opt for a single manager (since ó(n) ? 1 if n 1 1).
4.4. Simple Rules of Thumó
On the bs~sis of (9) and (10), some rules of thumb can now be dcxluced, which
are valid if the values of Ri for teams and single managers tve the sarne (and
approximately valid if they are close). Witiiout making any sssumptions on
ó(n), except that ó(1) - 1 and á(n) increases with n and is bounded for aU
finite n, we can now state:
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Rule 1. With posItive p (0 G p G 1) one should never choo~se n
such that b(n) 1 p 1 for a special decision or ê(n)(ë(n) f 1)~2 ~
p-1 for overall policy.
Rule 2. With negatlve p(-(n - 1)-1 G p G 0) one ahould
always choose n slightly smaller than 1-F- ~p~-1, provided such a
value is feasible.
The first rule tells us that, aince the value of a(n) can never attain its limit,
p-i, you ahould never choose a team so large that it takes p1 or more time
periods to reach a conclusion for a apecial decision. For overall firm policy
you even choose a much smaller team in general. The more people's views
overlap (the hígher p) the amaller the optunal team will be.
The scecund ndc~ oC tluuub dcrivcs frc~u thc Caut thut a(n) incrv~wc~c without
bounds as n--~ 1 f ~p~-1 euid thus can be~ made greater than the bounded
ó(n) or é(n)(ó(n) f 1)~2 by as much as we want. Aa ry becomes more and
more negative, managera' vicws diverge too much and we need to reduce the
team size. However, a slight negative correlation can lead to the exiatence
and uptiinr~lity of rclutivcly large teams. Au c~ffext oï "completucntarity" of
ntatiagers can gre.titly ittcrease thc valuc of thc tcant. Notc that tltis second
rule is not affected by the type of decisiona that have to be taken. It always
seems to pay to put together a team of managers that view isaues from some-
what different angles. R.emark that 1 -~ ~p~-1 can be quite large for small
negative conelations and teams of such size could be infeasible in practice.
In c:~scs wberc R.uM 2 indicutsa an tmreurxmubly large value for n, we can
rc~ort to the formulas in Subaections 4.1 and 4.2 for further guidance.
5. Illustrative Example
In this section we do some simulations using the model in section 6.2 of
Meinhold and Singpurwalla (1983). In particular, we use:
Bc -~(-1)eBi-1 i~ we, we ~ N(~,1).
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Rule 1. Wíth positIve p (0 C p G 1) one sóould never choo~se n
such that ë(n) ~ p-1 for a special decision or b(n)(ë(n) f 1)~2 1
p-1 for overall policy.
Rule 2. With negative p (-(n - 1)-1 c p G 0) one should
always choose n slightly smaller than 1-~ ~p~-1, provided such a
value is feasible.
The first rule tells us that, since the value of a(n) can aever attain its limit,
p-1, you shoulcl never cltoase a team so large that it takes p-1 or more time
periods to reach a conclusion for a special decision. For overall fu~m policy
you even choose a much smaller team in general. The more people's viewe
overlap (the lrigher p) the smaller the optintal team will be.
The ,t~cond rnlc of tLiuub dcrivcs frotu thc Lua tlutt a(n) increavc~ without
bounds as n~ 1 f ~p~-1 and thus can be made greater than tlie bounded
b(n) or b(n)(d(n) f 1)~2 by as much as we want. As ry becomes more and
more negative, managers' views diverge too ntuch ancl we need to reduce the
team size. However, a slight negative correlation can lead to the existence
and optitnrtlity of rclativcly largo teams. An effcxa o[ "cumpletnentarity" of
managers catt greatly incrc,ave the valuc of the tcam. Note that tltis seex)nd
rule is not affected by the type of decisions that have to be taken. It always
seems to pay to put together a team of managers that view issues from some-
what different angles. R.emark that 1-~ ~p~-1 can be quite large for small
negative correlations and teams of such size could be infeasible in practice.
In c.c.u,s where RuM 2 indicateg an tmreascxiably large value for n, we can
re~ort to the formulas in 5ubsections 4.1 ancl 4.2 for further guidance.
5. Illustrative Example
In this section we do some simulations using the model in section 6.2 of
Meinhold and Singpurwalla (1983). In particular, we use:
Bt - 2(-1)tBt-i t wn we ~ N(0,1).
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We set fT - 1 in equation (7), and a- 2 in equation ( 8) where we allow for
different valu~ of ry. We show simulations for ry--0.1, -0.025, 0, and 3.2
which imply values for p of -0.025, -0.00625, 0 and 0.8.5 We also use various
specifications for 6(n). We choose ~- Be - 1, and Co - I. To make the
problem manageable,e we set the maximum possible team size, n, equal to
15. The simulations illustrate a wide variety of cases. While our appro~rimate
formulas and rules of thumb work well in most casea, we also show situations
were some of the rules could passibly mislead us.
As for any team size, the procedure makc~ optilnal use of the information
on the state of the world, B, we shall focus here on the precision of the team's
forecast. In particular, since we are going to focus on firm policy,7 we average
the pc~terior prc.rision nf a sizo-n team forecasts from 3ë(n) ~ 1 to 46(n) (to
get away from the filter initialization). The results are ahown in tables 3 and
4.8 Tablc 3 shows the optimal team size for different values of 6(n) and p for
the overall firm policy.
Let us now compare thcse actual valuea of n' resulting from running the
Kalman filter with the values suggested by the approximate formulae in Sub-
sections 4.1 and 4.2. Comparing teams of size n with those of n f 1 membera,
the approximate rule in Subsection 4.1 successfully locates all the local optima
for p--0.00625, 0, and 0.8. Using the same rule to contrast size-n with size-
m teams, we differ from the globally optimal n' in table 3 for 6(n) - ~ánJ t 1
5 Wc retnind the reader that, with n- 15, p muat be betwcen -14-~ --0.071 and 1.
6 Note, for example, that with n manaE;ere we muat generate a Normal vector of dimenaion
n with covariance V. In acldition, the paesibk range of negative values Eot ry dacreaees as
n increases.
7 For ~pecial decixione, in this example, it is always optimal to have a team of the mazi-
miun size which allows to update the filter prior W the time when the Rpocial decision has
to bc takcu.
B Here lxf denotes the IarRest integer no greater than x.
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with p--0.00625 and p- 0. Thus, the approximation underlying this rule
seems reasonably accurate in this simulation. However, for p--0.025 the
approximate rule would lead us astray.
Zàble 3. Optimal team size for overall firm policy.
b p(n)
-0.025 -0.00625 0 0.8
n n'-n n'-1 n'-1 n'-1
~ánJ-F-1 n'-n n'-13 n'-5 n'-1
(~J n`-n n'-n n'-n n'-3
If we consider the evidence in table 3 in the light of the even simpler
rules of thumb in Subsection 4.4, we note tlrat for p- 0.8 Rule 1 excludes
n~ 1 for A(n) - n and ó(n) - ~ánJ f 1, sc~ that we worilcl takc rxactly the
optimal n' - 1. For d(n) - ~f J we find n L 3 accordirrg to Rule I, which
again corresponds to the actual n'. For p - -0.00625, RWe 2 would suggest
n- 160, but this is not a feasible team size ( the maximum size is 15). Thus,
Rule 2 can not really guide us here. However, for the case with p--0.025
Rule 2 indicates n- 40 and lrere n' is equal to the maximum size of 15. The
rule would thus, at least, point us in the right direction in tlris case.
6. Conclusion
Group clecision rnaking is common in many corporate organizations. Since
therc miglrt. be decrcasing marginal procluctivity in gathering and digesting
iufor,nation liy singlc, iudividuals, `ptuallcl proceacsing' by cArnmrittees is of-
ten usecl. However, as uoted, ruuorrg others, by KuL (1994), information
exchange in this context is also costly even ignoring strategic issues within a
managemcnt tcanr.
In this papcr we prc~ent a simple model where wc rnake this tradeoff ex-
plicit and characterize situations where largcr or snraller nwnagement teams
might be cleRirable clepeuding on c]iaracteristics of the covariance between
1J
Table 4. Average Forecast Precision for different values of p and b(n).
n - -0.025 P - o
á(n) - n ó(n) - ~3nJ f 1 á(n) - ~fJ ó(n) - n á(n) - ~3nJ t 1 á(n) - ~fJ
n ó(n) ~-~ á(n) C-i á(n) C-1 á(n) C-1 á(n) C-1 á(n) G;-~
1 1 1.0590 1 1.0590 1 1.0590 1 1.0590 1 1.0590 1 1.0590
2 2 1.0599 2 1.0599 1 1.3572 2 1.0526 2 1.0526 1 1.3430
3 3 1.0604 3 1.0604 1 1.6585 3 1.0460 3 1.0460 1 1.6160
4 4 1.0621 4 1.0621 2 1.3708 4 1.0403 4 1.0403 2 1.3274
5 5 1.0652 4 1.1939 2 1.5338 5 1.0358 4 1.107t 2 1.4806
6 6 1.0695 5 1.1334 2 1.7038 6 1.0322 5 1.0886 2 1.5921
7 7 1.0750 6 1.1291 2 1.8821 7 1.0292 6 1.0757 2 1.7224
8 8 1.0814 7 1.1287 2 2.0699 8 1.0267 7 1.0663 2 1.8518
9 9 1.0887 7 1.1855 3 1.7651 9 1.0246 7 1.1031 3 1.5730
10 10 1.0970 8 1.1837 3 1.9055 10 1.0229 8 1.0911 3 1.fr58(i
11 11 1.1061 9 1.1853 3 2.0547 11 1.0213 9 1.0816 3 1.7439
12 12 1.1162 10 1.1895 3 2.2138 12 1.0200 10 1.0740 3 1.8289
13 13 1.1273 10 1.2405 3 2.3838 13 1.0188 10 1.0994 3 1.9137
14 14 1.1394 11 1.2456 3 2.5662 14 1.0177 11 1.0907 3 1.9984
15 15 1.152 12 1.859~ 3 E.76E5 15 1.0168 12 1.0835 3 E.08E9
P - -0.00625 P - 0.8
ó(n) - n b(n) - ~'inJ ~ 1 á(n) -(~J ó(n) - n á(n) - 3nJ t 1 á(n) - fJ
n b(n) C-~ á(n) C-~ b(n) C-~ á(n) C-~ ó(n) C-~ ó(n) C-t
1 1 1.0590 1 1.0590 1 1.0590 1 1.0590 1 1.0590 1 1.0590
2 2 1.0533 2 1.0544 1 1.3465 2 0.9237 2 0.9237 1 1.0914
3 3 1.047:3 3 1.04!M 1 1.6262 3 0.8705 3 0.8705 1 I.lOSB
4 4 1.0424 4 1.0455 2 1.3377 4 0.8422 4 0.8422 2 0.9334
5 5 1.O:iHS 4 1.1157 2 1.4775 fi 0.8246 4 0.8432 2 0.93.55
6 6 1.Oa6!i .5 1.0988 2 1.G174 6 0.8126 5 0.8252 2 0.9369
7 7 1.0332 6 1.0876 2 1.757T 7 0.8040 6 0.8130 2 0.9379
8 H 1.0:313 7 1.0798 2 1.8990 8 0.7974 7 0.8042 2 0.9387
9 9 1.0299 7 1.120.5 3 1.6136 9 0.7923 7 0.8044 3 0.8767
10 10 1.02i;8 8 1.1102 3 1.7095 10 0.7882 8 0.7977 3 0.8770
11 11 1.0279 9 1.1024 3 1.8062 11 0.7848 9 0.7925 3 0.8773
12 12 1.0272 10 1.0965 3 1.9040 12 0.7819 10 0.7883 3 0.8775
13 13 1.02(i6 10 1.1262 3 2.0029 13 0.7795 10 0.7884 3 O.R777
14 14 1.0263 11 1.1193 3 2.1030 14 0.7774 11 0.7849 3 II.N77!)
15 15 1.(121i(1 12 1.11a8 :3 2.'10~2 1G 0.7756 12 0.7820 3 0.87tiU
the signxls that the managers observe. In particular, we find that ( 1) with
positive correlation between the managers' signals, the larger the correlation,
the smaller the optimal size will be; and (2) with negative correlation, a alight
negative correlation might lead to the exiatence of large management teama
la
due to a complementarity effect.
An example illustrates the relative accuracy of simple approximate formu-
las for choosing team sue, and also shows that even simpler rulcs of thumb
may work well in some cases. Both our approximate formulas and the rules
of thumb seem mast reliable for cases with positive correlation between man-
agers' observation errors. We conjecture that this would be the prevalent
situation in practice.
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